Will This GAO Report Sink Early Increment 1 Deployment by DoD?
March 11th, 2010 by Jack Mann
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
In a report currently under review by the Department of Defense, the GAO recommended that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates mandate that the Army correct maturity and reliability issues with its multi-billion-dollar Increment 1 systems and networks before approving any additional production or fielding any capabilities. The GAO advises the DoD to stay true to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ statement: to “get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.”
The report reads,
“As they transition away from the FCS concept, both the Army and DOD have an opportunity to improve the likely outcomes for the Army’s ground force modernization initiatives by adhering closely to recently enacted acquisition reforms and by seeking to avoid the numerous acquisition pitfalls that plagued FCS.” -GAO Report Dated March 10th, 2010
After canceling the Future Combat Systems, the “centerpiece” of the Army’s next-generation modernization program, the Army decided to spin off portions of the Future Combat Systems into a three-part brigade modernization program: Increment 1, Increment 2 and a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
The first program, Increment 1, is a continuation of previous FCS-related efforts to spin out emerging capabilities and technologies to current forces and is the subject of the report’s most concrete recommendations. The report is very critical of the Army’s haste in adopting Increment 1 programs: “in the first major acquisition decision for the Army’s post-FCS initiatives, DOD and the Army—because they want to support the warfighter quickly—are proceeding with low-rate initial production of one brigade set of Increment 1 systems despite having acknowledged that the systems are immature, unreliable, and cannot perform as required.”
The GAO is “concerned” that in the Army’s desire to deliver cutting-edge equipment to warfighters, commanders did not “strike the right balance” in approving initial production of Increment 1 of brigade modernization. “Although the Army will argue that it needs to field these capabilities as soon as possible, none of these systems have been designated as urgent and it is not helpful to provide early capability to the warfighter if those capabilities are not technically mature and reliable. If the Army moves forward too fast with immature Increment 1 designs, then that could cause additional delays as the Army and its contractors concurrently address technology, design, and production.”
The GAO noted “significant” financial investments in post-FCS modernization programs (see chart below), and acknowledged “a number of good features” like the Army’s decision to pursue an incremental approach as opposed to the comprehensive FCS effort, but emphasized that a balance must be struck between “what is needed, how fast it can be fielded, and how much it will cost.” Additionally, the report emphasized the accountability of the acquisition community for results, and said that “DoD and the Army must not be willing to accept whatever results are delivered regardless of military utility.”
Bottom line: the GAO is questioning why the Army wants to rush Increment 1 programs to deployment when R&D is still trying to correct serious problems with reliability and program maturity. Though the DoD hasn’t yet commented on whether it will act on the GAO’s recommendations, but judging from the fate of the F-22, expensive programs will likely be scrutinized more closely for cost-effectiveness, and a billion-dollar rushed implementation of a troubled program seems unlikely.
[...] to the GAO, Increment 1 is “immature, unreliable, and cannot perform as required.” The report also expressed concern that the Army was trying to field its modernization [...]